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3 .   S PAT I A L   J U S T I C E   A N D   H O U S I N G   I N   I R E L A N D
Rory Hearne, Rob Kitchin and Cian O’Callaghan
The right to housing is internationally recognized, as by the United
Nations, whose conventions have been ratified by most national gov-
ernments (Edgar et al. 2002). In consequence, housing is often
considered within a social justice framework that is concerned with
inequalities in rights across people, differentiated by class, gender, race,
and so on. But housing can also be considered from a spatial justice
perspective; that is, considering the inequalities and disparities between
places (Soja 2010). Whereas social justice seeks a redistribution of rights
and resources across people, spatial justice seeks a redistribution
between locales. Of course the two are strongly aligned, with poor
people living in poor places (Pringle et al. 1999), yet similar groups of
people living in different places can have markedly different experiences
in terms of the quality of housing units and access to basic utilities;
where one lives or works can affect access to social goods and life
chances (Dorling, Chapter 1, this volume; Kearns, Introduction, this
volume). These spatialized economic and social inequalities are rooted
in the structural and territorial processes that underpin capitalist
economies, and widen under conditions of crisis, austerity and neolib-
eral policies as adjustment mechanisms are applied (Agnew, Chapter
2, this volume; Harvey, in Morrissey, Chapter 11, this volume). 
In this chapter, we examine social and spatial injustices with respect
to housing in Ireland, focusing on three concerns. The first is social
housing, examining access to such housing in general and the provision
of habitable and safe units given the collapse in regeneration initiatives.
The second is the phenomena of unfinished estates and substandard
private housing stock. The third is the issue of mortgage arrears and
negative equity in the aftermath of the collapse of the Irish economy
and property market. In the final section we examine why these social
and spatial injustices are likely to persist given the structural forces of
austerity at work in Ireland that reproduce and deepen social and spatial
inequalities.
Social housing 
Throughout the twentieth century Irish local authorities were impor-
tant providers of housing for lower income families and individuals
(Drudy and Punch 2005). Over time, the tenure itself has become stig-
matized, as outlined in the recent Government Housing Policy
Statement:
Housing in Ireland has been characterised by a persistently
hierarchical structure for several decades. This paradigm of
housing has private home ownership at the top, with sup-
ported home-ownership (tenant purchase of local authority
housing, affordable housing) next, self-financed private
rented accommodation further down, and State supported
rental accommodation at the bottom (rent supplement/
social housing tenancies). This structure and the value judge-
ment that underlies it – which implicitly holds that the
tenure which must ultimately be aspired to is homeowner-
ship – has had a considerable role in leading the Irish
housing sector, Irish economy, and the wider Irish society
to where they are today (DECLG 2011c, 1).
However, social housing also has many benefits for its tenants,
including relatively low rents, (generally) greater security of tenure, and
for most tenants a permanent home within a community where they
have strong family and neighbourhood connections. 
Access to social housing has reached crisis point in Ireland in two
main senses: there is not enough of it, and what there is is often in very
poor condition. Both are clear expressions of social and spatial injustices
in housing provision within the state. With respect to the amount of
stock, there are two primary issues. First, the total amount of stock has
been dramatically reduced in recent decades as a result of neoliberal
housing policies, including the sale of housing stock (privatization) and
prioritization of private market support measures (Hearne 2011). In
1961 social housing comprised 18% of all residences; in 2011 this
figure had been reduced to 8% (129,033 units) (CSO 2012c). Second,
there is increasing demand for social housing due to dramatic house-
hold growth over the past 20 years, coupled in more recent years with
the economic crisis that has seen unemployment rise to over 14%. The
number of households in need of social housing has thus increased from
43,684 in 2005 to 98,318 in 2011 (see Table 3.1), in large part because
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households are occupying properties they cannot afford, many of which
are substandard and are leased by amateur landlords (in 2011 74% of
landlords managed just one property; Sirr 2013). This crisis of afford-
ability is also revealed in the numbers of households in receipt of rent
supplement, a payment to those who cannot afford private rented rates.
97,260 households were receiving rent supplement in late 2010, an
increase of 63% in the previous three years. Spending on rent supple-
ment rose from €70 million in the mid-1990s to €500 million in 2010.
Table 3.1 also demonstrates that homelessness is a growing problem.
The Housing Needs Assessment of 2011 revealed that the number of
homeless households had risen from 1,394 in 2008 to 2,348 in 2011.
Furthermore, there were 3,808 people in accommodation for the home-
less in 2011, of whom 1,648 (including 457 children under the age of
15) were in emergency accommodation (Housing Agency 2011, 12).
HOUSING    NEEDS 
Homeless persons 
Travellers
Persons living in accommodation that is unfit or
materially unsuitable
Persons living in overcrowded accommodation
Young persons living in institutional care or
without family accommodation
Persons in need of accommodation on medical
or compassionate grounds
Older persons 
Persons with a disability
Persons not reasonably able to meet the cost of
the accommodation they are occupying or
obtain suitable alternative accommodation
98,318 
2,348
1,824 
1,708 
8,534 
538 
9,548 
2,266 
1,315 
65,643 
TABLE 3.1  Housing Needs Assessment 2011 (Housing Agency 2011, 12)
Much of the social housing that the state has retained is generally
acknowledged to be in poor condition. Many local authority estates
located in Ireland’s most disadvantaged urban areas suffered from inad-
equate and ineffective local authority maintenance and management
and intensifying social and economic disadvantage in the 1990s. They
came to be characterized by substandard housing conditions, social
problems, high unemployment, drug addiction and associated gang-
related crime, and low education participation rates. Tenants and
residents of the estates campaigned for physical and social improve-
ments, expressing a strong commitment to their local community
(Bissett 2008; Fahey et al. 2011; Hearne 2011). The perceived solution
from 2001 onwards was Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) that were
intended to leverage the rising value of the estates’ prime development
land to provide new social housing stock. PPPs entailed the transfer of
the public land to a private developer who could build and sell owner-
occupier housing and commercial/retail units in return for providing a
reduced amount of new social housing and some community facilities
on the remainder of the site, with, in some instances, a social services
fund (Hearne 2011; Redmond and Hearne 2013). This reflected regen-
eration trends across Europe, with urban renewal focusing on
entrepreneurial, market-led approaches that would create social trans-
formation (gentrification) centred on replacing poor people with higher
income newcomers (Van Gent 2010).
Indeed, all aspects of planning and development in Ireland became
market- and developer-led, underpinned by a neoliberal ethos and entre-
preneurial practice (Kitchin et al. 2012; Mahon, Chapter 4, this volume).
The use of PPPs for regeneration would, it was argued, create a better
social mix, diminishing concentrations of social and low-income housing
(DEHLG, 2005). A National Regeneration Programme was developed
in this period primarily based on private finance from developers
(although there was considerable exchequer funding in Ballymun), com-
prising Limerick, parts of Dublin City and regional towns including
Sligo, Dundalk and Tralee. These were supplemented with state-funded
area-based social inclusion programmes implemented through national
anti-poverty schemes, notably the community development programme,
and youth and education services (Fahey et al. 2011).
However, the financial and property crash of 2008 revealed the
extent of over-reliance of the regeneration projects on private sector
funding and a booming housing market. As property prices plunged,
the private residential and commercial aspects were no longer deemed
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economically viable by private finance, and the PPP projects collapsed
as private developers withdrew from the contracts. Only one project had
been completed at the time of the crash (Hearne 2011). This left thou-
sands of local authority tenants living in substandard conditions and
many hundreds permanently relocated in preparation for regeneration
(see Table 3.2 with regard to eight Dublin estates). Conditions in the
estates subsequently deteriorated further, including severe structural
problems such as sewage invasions, mould and dampness causing health
problems, and serious antisocial behaviour as a result of emptying of the
estates in preparation for regeneration (see Figures 3.1 and 3.2). 
ESTATE
Croke Villas 
St Michael’s Estate 
St Teresa’s Gardens
Charlemont Street
Bridgefoot Street 
Chamber Street/
Weaver Court 
O’Devaney Gardens 
Dominick Street 
ORIGINAL
UNITS
87
346
346
181
143
60 
278
198
TABLE 3.2   Occupancy rates on PPP regeneration estates in Dublin
City, 2008 and 2013 (Hearne 2011, 2013)
UNITS 
OCCUPIED 
JULY 2008 
38 
14 
300
141
0 
2 
178
108 
UNITS 
OCCUPIED 
MARCH 2013
17
0
108
70
0
0
50
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Unfinished estates and substandard, newly built housing stock
At the height of the property bubble in Ireland, the country was expe-
riencing a building frenzy. In 1993 21,391 new units were built; this
grew steadily year on year to peak at 88,419 new units in 2006
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FIGURE 3.1    Living in half-empty estates: St Teresa’s Gardens local
authority estate in Dublin’s inner city (photograph by authors)
FIGURE 3.2    Living in substandard conditions: sewage invasions in
Dolphin House local authority estate, Dublin’s inner city 
(photograph by authors)
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FIGURE 3.3  Locations of unfinished estates in Ireland (DECLG 2011a)
ESTATES  SURVEYED
Number of Units per Estate
0–53
54–152
153–355
356–899
900–2314
Source: DoEHLG, National Building Agency
(DECLG 2010). As the economy and market started to turn, develop-
ment continued, with 78,027 units being completed in 2007 and
51,724 in 2008. Moreover, this additional supply was surplus to demo-
graphic demand (Kitchin et al. 2010). With house prices falling and
too many units vis-à-vis households, the Irish landscape sprouted what
were colloquially termed ‘ghost estates’ (McWilliams 2006; see Figure
3.3). In October 2011, the Department of Environment, Community
and Local Government, in its National Housing Development Survey,
reported that there were 2,876 documented unfinished estates in
Ireland, present in every county in the state (DECLG 2011b). There
were 122,048 units on these estates, of which 18,638 dwellings (15%)
were recorded as complete and vacant and further 17,872 units (15%)
as incomplete. 2,066 unfinished housing developments still required
building work in terms of finishing off units or completing services
such as roads, footpaths, lighting and sewage treatment. Of these, 1,822
developments were recorded as having no current building activity. The
2012 survey appeared to show a significant drop in the number of
unfinished estates, to 1,770, but this was principally achieved by chang-
ing the definition of what constituted an unfinished estate, excluding
those with issues of oversupply only (Kitchin 2012). In fact, very few
estates were dramatically different in material terms one year on,
beyond being tidied up rather than completed and areas under con-
struction being fenced off.
Those people who had bought off the plans at the height of the
boom or before the market started to nose-dive often found themselves
living on estates that did not match their vision for their new home
and neighbourhood. Instead, they occupied estates that had issues of
vacancy and/or incompleteness, both of which produced a series of
ongoing health and safety issues (Kitchin et al. 2014). Vacancy encour-
aged antisocial behaviour and vandalism, with empty units being used
for parties, brothels, the selling of drugs, squatting, and so on.
Incompleteness includes the lack of pavements, poor road surfaces,
sewage contamination, poor water quality, unsecured construction
materials, open excavation pits, uncovered manholes, partially com-
pleted buildings that could be unstable, no street lighting, no open or
play areas, and isolation from neighbours. For estates in rural areas, in
particular, there are issues over access to services such as schools,
crèches, medical centres and public transport. In cases where an estate
management company is meant to be in place to manage the services,
low levels of occupancy make such companies unviable, meaning that
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service provision is patchy or non-existent (Mahon and Ó Cinnéide
2010). Moreover, residents in these estates are living with the stress of
an uncertain future with regard to works being completed, massive neg-
ative equity (in excess of 60% from peak), and a reduced sense of place
and community. 
In addition to the issue of unfinished estates, it has become clear
that there are build quality issues with respect to many housing units
built during the boom. Some units are substandard in terms of build
control compliance and many are noted for their poor soundproofing,
lackadaisical finishing, and quick deterioration. Building control and
standards were deregulated in Ireland in 1990, with local authority
planning enforcement undertaking inspections on only 10–15% of
sites and not at all stages of development. Developers and builders self-
certifying building standards compliance, coupled with a high-volume
housing boom that demanded ‘build a lot, fast’, led to corners being
cut on many developments. Two of the highest profile cases are Priory
Hall in Dublin and the Gleann Riada estate in Longford. In the Priory
Hall case, 187 apartments were deemed unfit for human habitation
due to serious fire hazard breaches. In late 2011, all the residents were
ordered to vacate the units until such time as the problems were fixed.
Over 18 months later, the residents were still living in temporary
accommodation, while required to pay mortgages on homes they could
not occupy; their plight was resolved only in November 2013. In the
Gleann Riada case, an entire apartment block was demolished in mid-
2012, having never been occupied. The houses in the estate have
problems of carbon monoxide, methane and hydrosulphite gases
leaking into them from ruptured pipes underneath, and these have
resulted in a couple of explosions (RTÉ 2012b). In addition, there are
estimated to be in excess of 20,000 homes, though the DECLG so far
recognizes only 74 estates with 12,250 units, whose foundation hard-
core is contaminated with pyrite, which expands leading to the
crowning of floors and the buckling of walls (DECLG 2012). These
pyrite-affected units are predominantly located in Dublin City, Fingal,
Meath, Kildare, and Offaly.
There are clearly issues of social and spatial injustice being experi-
enced by those living on unfinished estates or estates plagued by
building quality issues in terms of the conditions they endure relative
to other locales and the extent to which their homes are safe, secure
and habitable. More than five years into the crisis, however, unfinished
estates remain a feature of the Irish landscape and are likely to do so
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for quite some time, and the issues faced by residents of poorly built
units and estates affected by pyrite remain largely unaddressed. 
Negative equity and mortgage arrears
Between 1991 and 2007 the average new house price rose by 429% in
Dublin and 382% for the whole country, with average second-hand
prices rising 551% in Dublin and 489% for the whole country in the
same period (DECLG 2010). In Q3 1995 the average secondhand
house price was 4.1 times the average industrial wage of €18,152; by
Q2 2007 secondhand house prices had risen to 11.9 times the average
industrial wage of €32,616 (Brawn 2009). Between 2007 and the end
of 2012 prices nationally dropped 48% for houses and 62% for apart-
ments (CSO 2012j). The consequence of such a drop has been to place
those that took out a property loan from c.2000 onwards in negative
equity. The Central Bank estimated in 2010 that 34% of residential
mortgages were in negative equity, with 52% of buy-to-let mortgages
in a similar position (Kennedy and McIndoe-Calder 2012). By mid-
2012 it was estimated that more than 50% of residential mortgages
were in negative equity (RTÉ 2012a).
Moreover, due to the deterioration of the general economy and the
rise in unemployment and underemployment, mortgage holders, espe-
cially those who bought at the height of the boom, have been struggling
to pay their monthly payments. Of the 792,096 total residential mort-
gages in the state in December 2012, 143,851 were in arrears (18%);
with 94,488 more than 90 days in arrears (12%) (Central Bank 2013;
see Figure 3.4). There were an additional 42,031 residential mortgages
that had been restructured (e.g., term extension, reduced payment,
interest only) but were not in arrears. 28,421 (19%) buy-to-let accounts
were in arrears of more than 90 days as of December 2012. However,
repossession and voluntary surrenders were low, with just 38 residences
repossessed on a court order and 96 surrendered in Q4 2012, though
this may be set to rise with the relaxation by the Central Bank on the
code of conduct of banks in dealing with those in arrears.
Negative equity and mortgage arrears create two types of spatial
injustice: first, they create a spatial trap that restricts mobility and,
second, they affect some places more than others by dint of the age and
type of housing stock and the demographics of its occupants. Because
the value of the property is less than was paid for it, owners cannot sell
and move to another property without realizing a loss. This trap might
Spatial justice and housing in Ireland
66
67
Rory Hearne, Rob Kitchin and Cian O’Callaghan
be a problem in that the property might not be suitable for the family
situation any longer, or the owner needs to move to seek work. Negative
equity thus has labour market consequences. Even if the owner is pre-
pared to sell at a loss, the property market is barely operational in most
of the country, with very few properties selling, exacerbating the spatial
trap. One can get an indication of the areas likely to be experiencing
relatively high rates of negative equity and mortgage distress by using
the 2011 census to map the percentage of properties built since 2001
and with an outstanding mortgage (though this ignores negative equity
in the secondhand housing market). 
This map (see Figure 3.5) suggests that while issues of negative equity
and arrears are prevalent across the whole country, the commuter
suburbs of the principal cities are most likely to be badly affected.
Counties such as Meath and Kildare experienced high rates of newly
built properties and new household formation all through the boom,
%
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but especially in the latter years when the inner suburbs became too
expensive for first-time buyers and those trading up to a family home.
Given that the state was not active in building new social housing in
this period, housing in these areas was bought either by households or
by buy-to-let landlords, who in the Irish case are nearly all small, family
investors rather than institutional investors. Given the drop in house
prices, just about every property built post-2001 in these areas will be
in negative equity to some degree, with those built in the latter years of
the boom having lost up to 50% of their market value. Beyond the
stresses for those that are spatially trapped and fearful of losing their
home, negative equity and mortgage arrears restrict the pool of proper-
ties available to the market and limit any recovery in the housing market
to first-time buyers, those prepared to realize a loss, those whose property
is not in negative equity, and those who have spare investment capital.
Framing Ireland’s housing injustices 
Between 1993 and 2007 the Irish economy experienced the Celtic
Tiger years, with growth in GDP soaring year on year. The unemploy-
ment rate fell to the lowest in Europe, with the number of people at
work almost doubling between 1992 and 2007 (CSO 2013e). The
population grew at a rapid pace, through natural growth, returning
migrants and immigrants. Consequently a housing boom grew in
tandem, driven by rising demand and being an investment sink for
new-found wealth. Both the wider economy and housing policy were
shaped by the adoption of neoliberal policies, complemented by polit-
ical clientelism, cronyism and localism (Kitchin et al. 2012; Kearns,
Introduction, this volume). Government policy promoted the free
market, minimized regulation, and privatized public goods such as
social housing (Mahon, Chapter 4, this volume). The state loosened
the regulation of both the finance and construction industries, intro-
duced widespread tax incentive schemes to stimulate development, thus
subsidizing construction when none was needed, changed the param-
eters of stamp duty, lowered capital gains tax, allowed developers to
forgo their affordable and social housing obligations, and promoted a
laissez-faire planning system that presumed development. Banks com-
peted to lend investment capital to developers and mortgage credit to
customers. Rents were left to the open market, with few rights of
tenancy or protections for tenants. Local government actively encour-
aged, competed for, and proactively facilitated new development. At
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the same time, it sought to withdraw from social housing, shifting
public housing provision to a subsidized private rental market (in 2010,
~95,000 households received rent supplement allowance; DECLG
2011c), or where it did invest it did so through PPPs. Consequently,
the social housing stock contracted. 
In turn, property became a key driver in the Irish economy, a sig-
nificant component of GDP growth, a major sector of employment
(13% of all workers), and a major source of tax revenue. By 2006 VAT,
capital gains tax, stamp duty and development levies constituted 17%
of the Irish tax intake (White 2006). The government thus had a sig-
nificant stake in the housing model as constituted, dominated as it
was by the private sector (banks, developers, speculators, landlords),
and heavily favouring their interests (Honohan 2010; Kitchin et al.
2010). This model fostered speculator capitalism (Agnew, Chapter 2,
this volume). 
The same government that had been in power all through the boom
remained in office until 2010, overseeing the state’s initial handling
(from 2008) of the unfolding financial and property crisis, and setting
Ireland on a path to austerity. Not surprisingly, in addressing the crisis
the government did not shift radically in its broad ideological thrust.
Initially, the bursting of the housing bubble was explained as a conse-
quence of the wider global financial crisis, and later as a consequence
of corrupt practices. The model itself was, and continues to be, thought
of as fundamentally sound. The objective in crisis management, there-
fore, was to stabilize the economy using neoliberal tools – bailing out
private interests, privatizing public assets, and implementing austerity
policies that reduce public services and shift wealth from individual cit-
izens to private corporations. In so doing, the Irish state pursued two
broad tactics: first, collectivizing private debt into public debt in the
hope of cauterizing the problem and forestalling a full collapse, thus
reinstilling market confidence; secondly, undertaking a programme of
minimal-effort, minimal-cost initiatives giving the impression of policy-
at-work, but to a large degree merely kicking the problem down the
road for the market to correct when it rebounds. 
The first tactic took two interrelated forms in Ireland. The first was
the bank guarantee in November 2008, wherein the state guaranteed
all the potential liabilities of the Irish-owned banks, followed by the
bank bailout when those guarantees were drawn on as the banks col-
lapsed and were nationalized. The second was the establishment of the
National Asset Management Agency (NAMA), signed into law in
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September 2009. The initial premise of NAMA was to relieve Irish
banks of their impaired assets, providing them instead with govern-
ment-backed bonds which they could use to borrow from the European
Central Bank, thereby injecting liquidity into the Irish banking system.
It had the effect too of protecting both the banks and developers from
going bust quickly. In total, €73.6bn of loans on impaired property
assets was transferred to the agency for a cost of €31.8bn for the Irish
taxpayer (43% of the loan value). Two-thirds of loans relate to Irish
development and land, the rest to properties principally in the UK, the
US and continental Europe. The agency operates largely as a black box
(being exempt from freedom of information regulations), is staffed by
bankers and property experts mainly recruited from the companies it
has bailed out, and, given its size, it significantly overshadows the Irish
property market and its operation. The primary focus of the agency is
to restore the market and ensure that the state recovers its investment
in the portfolio it manages. It has not been charged with addressing
issues of spatial justice or public interest (as was the US Resolution
Trust Corporation, an equivalent agency to NAMA). 
The second tactic is meant to address some issues of spatial justice
through specific policies and initiatives, but in reality it consists of
applying sticking plasters and waiting to see if the patient recovers on
its own or can last long enough for the doctor, in the form of the
market, to reappear. Here we discuss what the state is doing to address
the spatial injustices discussed above. 
During the period of austerity from 2008 onwards the social
housing budget has suffered severe retrenchment. For example, excheq-
uer funding for the National Regeneration Programme has been
reduced from €121 million in 2008 to €80 million in 2013, a 34%
reduction (Redmond and Hearne 2013). Similarly, since 2008, the
capital expenditure for social housing has been reduced by 80% (from
€1.3bn to €275m), while there was a 90% decrease in housing output
from local authorities between 2007 and 2011 (McManus 2013). As a
result, regeneration plans have been completely abandoned for some
estates, and redeveloped and rescaled in others. Disadvantaged areas
have also been affected by the reduction in government funding for
voluntary community organizations, including community develop-
ment projects, youth services, and community drugs projects. It is
estimated that by the end of 2013, the voluntary and community sector
will have contracted by 35% on its 2008 level, leading to a loss of
11,150 jobs in the sector (Harvey 2012). 
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The community employment scheme was also significantly altered,
as its training budget and the length of time for participants were
reduced. The abolition of additional payments for those with disabilities
and lone parents severely impacted on the vital role that these schemes
play in the social regeneration of their areas. These cuts have been com-
pounded by the reduction in resources and the employment embargo
for essential, area-based, social public services, such as the Gardaí, local
authority estate managers and local health services (Hearne 2013).
Meanwhile, the rent supplement scheme continues to grow even though
it is a massive subsidy to private landlords. As part of the austerity
budgets the rent limits for the receipt of rent supplement have been
reduced and a greater contribution sought from the tenant, despite
average national rents increasing, and higher increases still in Dublin
(Daft.ie 2013). These changes require the (often vulnerable) tenant to
renegotiate with landlords who are in an already powerful position.
Moreover, substandard accommodation within the private rented sector
continues to be a cause for concern (Threshold 2013). 
The over-emphasis on relocation of residents and demolition,
instead of focusing on sustaining the living conditions for existing com-
munities, has resulted in the removal and dispersal of working-class
communities, thus irreversibly dismantling the original social struc-
tures. The destabilization, decay and destruction of communities is a
significant and irreplaceable loss to the social, historical and cultural
fabric of these areas. The residents that remain are left waiting in poor
conditions and are, generally, those suffering the most intense social
and economic inequalities such as high levels of vulnerability, poverty
and disadvantage; they include the elderly and lone parents (Hearne
2011). It appears that social housing will continue to be undermined
under the current administration, despite the urgent need. 
One policy that was designed to address both the social housing
waiting list and unfinished estates is the Social Housing Leasing
Initiative (SHLI), launched in September 2009 to complement the work
of NAMA (DECLG 2009). The SHLI seeks to rent vacant units in
unfinished estates in order to house households on the waiting list. The
units are rented on 20-year leases, but are tenanted, managed and main-
tained by the local authority, with the rent guaranteed for the whole
lease period regardless of occupancy. At the end of the lease the house
reverts to the landlord. The scheme has been extended to voluntary
housing associations. Regardless of the fact that the state is effectively
paying a mortgage and acting as a landlord but not gaining ownership,
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the scheme has barely made a dent in the social housing waiting list,
nor resolved vacancy in unfinished estates, though it has provided a
guaranteed income to some developers. While housing associations and
other charity organizations initially campaigned for the allocation of
vacant units on unfinished estates for social housing purposes, as the
remote location of many of these estates became known they began to
express misgivings, indicating the potential of this strategy to create
further spatial injustices. The housing association Respond!, for instance,
while discussing its intention to purchase 4,000 recently built houses to
provide community-based housing, stressed that it was ‘seeking to pur-
chase in viable communities, not ghost estates’ (Shanahan 2010). 
In addition to the SHLI, the other main policy with respect to
unfinished estates is Site Resolution Plans (SRPs), formally adopted as
policy in October 2011 (DECLG 2011c, 2011e). SRPs are a partner-
ship approach to addressing outstanding development issues on estates.
It seeks to use negotiation and existing legislation to persuade the
owners and developers of estates to create and implement an action
plan. This plan is drawn up by a panel of stakeholders (developers,
banks, local authorities, residents, estate management companies,
Health and Safety Authority, etc.). SRPs are non-mandatory, volun-
taristic, deregulated, lack compulsive mechanisms, have timeframes
that are suggestive, and possess no conflict resolution mechanisms
beyond the panel. They are meant to be organized and driven by local
authorities, which are being given no additional resources for such a
role. To a large degree the lack of finance to complete estates and devel-
oper insolvency is ignored, and the government fund to support SRPs
is €5m – a paltry sum to address the multiple problems that exist across
the 1,770 estates that require further development work. Rather, this
fund is designed to address pressing health and safety issues, leaving
other issues to be corrected by the market at a later date. In the mean-
time, residents continue to live with such spatial injustices.
Households experiencing mortgage arrears have been similarly left
in limbo. A 2012 report commissioned by the Money Advice and
Budgeting Service (MABS), which drew on a series of interviews with
households accessing its services, presented a candid and often alarming
picture of the effects of stress on those experiencing mortgage arrears –
marital and familial strife, serious depression and, in the case of one
interviewee, attempted suicide (Norris and Brooke 2011). The report
makes clear that for those in mortgage arrears, financial problems are
a source of constant worry that perforates all aspects of their day-to-
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day existence. However, while the mechanisms of the bank bailout and
NAMA have effectively protected banks and developers from insol-
vency, proposals for some type of mortgage ‘debt-forgiveness’ have been
consistently met with warnings of moral hazard (Cooper 2010). The
severity of the drop in house prices augurs poorly for any prospect of
market recovery in the short to medium term. The mortgages these
households are repaying no longer correspond to current realities, and
it is probable that house prices will not reach anywhere near the peak
levels of the boom within the lifetime of borrowers. The severity of this
disjuncture seems to suggest that these problems cannot be remedied
by the corrective forces of the market. As the MABS report points out,
doing nothing will be more costly in the long run than taking measures
to address the issue. 
The approach from the Government, however, has been haphazard
and has served the banks rather than households. Indeed, while advo-
cacy group the Irish Mortgage Holders Organisation had hoped that
the Central Bank’s revised Code of Conduct on Mortgage Arrears
(Central Bank of Ireland 2013) might include stronger protections for
households in arrears, it has instead given lenders more power to harass
borrowers by lifting the limit of three contacts per calendar month and
has failed to install adequate proscriptive measures to protect, for
example, borrowers who are being forced off advantageous tracker
mortgages as part of the restructuring process. In the absence of guide-
lines that are more appropriate to the current reality, the banks have
been restructuring mortgages on a case-by-case basis. But, like the poli-
cies addressing unfinished estates, this strategy merely staves off rather
than resolves the crisis.
Moreover, in that the housing market is now highly fragmented,
with some recovery in parts of Dublin but with none in other areas,
the geography of mortgage arrears is also likely to be characterized by
spatial inequalities. There is a strong possibility that there will never be
a market for some properties, and with employment increasingly con-
centrated in urban areas, many households may find themselves
trapped by negative equity in areas with burgeoning unemployment
and few opportunities. Although there have been relatively few repos-
sessions to date, it is expected that they will increase in the future. In
March 2013, in response to this, Finance Minister Michael Noonan
suggested that he could ‘envisage repossessions in the buy-to-let sector’
(O’Halloran 2013). While this statement seems to imply that families
will not lose their homes, repossessions on buy-to-let mortgages put
75
Rory Hearne, Rob Kitchin and Cian O’Callaghan
additional strain on the private rental market, thus reducing the tenure
security of some households in this sector. As such, the lack of decisive
action on mortgage arrears exacerbates the existing imbalance between
tenure options, while intensifying social and spatial injustices. 
Conclusion
The catastrophic fallout of the property crash has had a series of social
and spatial repercussions for households that are only beginning to
become apparent. During the Celtic Tiger period housing policy was
increasingly neoliberalized. The privatization of social housing and the
rolling out of PPP regeneration schemes in many instances served to
erode existing social housing infrastructures. This was coupled with
lowered barriers of entry to the mortgage and buy-to-let market. In
tandem these processes led to a greater proportion of households being
catered for through the private sector. The result of the Celtic Tiger
economic and property boom, then, was the contraction rather than
expansion of housing tenure options, with owner-occupation being
generally seen as the only secure form of tenure (O’Connell and
Finnerty 2012).
During the crisis the neoliberalization of housing has been deepened.
The broad tactics of the Irish state have saddled the general populace
with the debt of the failed banks and developers, yet do not substantively
address the housing injustices that many of them face, and do nothing
at all to alter the fundamentals of how the Irish housing market is con-
stituted and works, assuming that future housing will be the preserve of
the private market and will work to the benefit of private interests. As
such, the property crash has left in its wake a housing system not only
inherently unequal, but now fundamentally unfit for purpose. In other
words, present policies perpetuate and entrench social and spatial injus-
tices, making them increasingly difficult to dislodge. The danger is that
the imbalanced spatial and institutional landscapes deposited by the
crash, left to the whims of the market, will calcify into a nation increas-
ingly characterized by geographically uneven development. 
The need for (and indeed right to) decent social housing cannot be
questioned given the housing waiting list figures and the high depend-
ence on rent supplement. Providing social housing and regeneration
can be a win–win scenario. Delivering it on a large scale offers the
potential for real economic and social stimulus for local communities
and for the wider society and economy. It seems counterintuitive not
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to be giving social housing a much greater role in the current period.
There is also a historic opportunity to change the culture and popular
perception of social housing from a stigmatized tenure to one to which
many people would be glad to have access, with affordable, high-quality
and safe homes in decent neighbourhoods.
The greater role assigned to voluntary housing bodies in govern-
ment policy in recent years has the potential to support this
development. However, there is a danger that forcing voluntary housing
bodies to rely only on private finance will push them in a commercial
direction, repeating the failure of the PPP experience. Similarly, the
overreliance on private market mechanisms to remedy the problems
posed by unfinished estates and mortgage arrears, along with the con-
tinued support for banks and developers over the needs of households,
testifies to a bewildering short-sightedness on the part of the govern-
ment. The Department of Environment, local authorities, and
voluntary housing bodies, along with the funding agencies including
the Housing Finance Agency and government, have a responsibility to
respond to the crisis in a manner way beyond what is currently being
undertaken. The ideological opposition to social housing and obsessive
support of the private rented and property market must be put aside
to develop alternative approaches that place the primary value of
housing as a home and a right, and not a commodity. 
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